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Abstract
While green-labeled buildings have been found to sell at a premium compared to nearby
controls with similar observable characteristics, the voluntary nature of the labeling
decision implies green-labeled buildings may have different unmeasured characteristics
that may account for at least a portion of the premium. Therefore, it is unclear whether
green-labeled building premiums are a causal effect of the labels. I use data on repeat
sales transactions and detailed hedonic characteristics to test whether green-labeled
office buildings were selling at a premium before they were labeled, and combine these
results with post-labeling price premium estimates to identify realized cost-benefit ratios
for green-labeling policies. The data suggest the causal net benefits of green labels
range from $11.50-$19.95 per square foot. The estimated net benefits are smaller than
previous estimates that have focused solely on the benefits and ignored the potential
biases from nonrandom selection.
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1. Introduction
Environmentally sustainable building practices, as sanctioned by green-labeling programs
developed by the Environmental Protection Agency and the United States Green Buildings
Council, have been growing at near-exponential levels in recent years (Kok et al. (2011)),
yet an unresolved question is whether value premiums accruing to green-labeled buildings
are a causal effect of receiving a label. Green-labeled buildings differ significantly from the
average office building on the basis of observable characteristics, and since participation in
these programs is voluntary, nonrandom selection into the stock of green buildings may result
in both observed and unobserved heterogeneity that may account for at least a portion of the
premium. For example, buildings whose owners seek to undergo the third-party monitoring
and verification required in the labeling process tend to be landmark structures with unique
architectural characteristics, which reinforces the likelihood that unobservable characteristics
differ among labeled and unlabeled buildings.
The Energy Star and LEED labeling programs have been credited with delivering both
significant energy savings and value premiums in green-labeled buildings (Turner and Frankel
(2008), EPA (2006)), Eichholtz et al. (2010), Eichholtz et al. (2013)). However, determining
to what extent green building premiums arise from selection bias affects the realized net
benefits of green labeling policies, and has broader implications for climate policy. Green
labels can be an economically efficient response to informational market failures that dampen
the returns to energy conservation investments (Jaffe and Stavins (1994)). They may im-
prove market outcomes in cases when adverse selection makes property managers unable to
persuasively communicate building characteristics to potential buyers and tenants (Milgrom
(2008)). If green labels cause energy efficient buildings to obtain market premiums that
they otherwise would not have received due to adverse selection, they can play a part in
the optimal mix of policy responses to the climate change externality, to the extent that
the benefits of green labels outweigh their costs. However, this latter point remains open to
question (Fuerst and McAllister (2011a), Newsham et al. (2009), Navarro (2009)).
In this paper, I use repeat sales observations and detailed building hedonic characteristics
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to estimate pre-labeling price premiums in buildings that subsequently received a green label,
compared to similar buildings that never received a label. Since the green building sample
is restricted to 206 buildings with data on sales transactions both before and after they
received a label, I proceed to estimate post-labeling value premiums in green buildings and
take the difference in the pre- and post-labeling price premiums, to obtain an estimate of
the gain to labeling. Finally, I combine the gain to labeling estimate with data on the costs
of obtaining a label, and calculate realized cost-benefit ratios for green labels.
The identification strategy uses the repeat sales data to difference out the effect of un-
observed characteristics on building value. By differencing out potential sources of bias that
remain constant before and after a building obtained a label, and incorporating the costs
of green labels to obtain an estimate of the net benefits of a label, the approach improves
upon previous work that has found large positive value premiums from green labels, such as
Eichholtz et al. (2010).
The results indicate that the stock of green-labeled buildings that sold before they re-
ceived a label did not sell at a premium compared to observationally similar control build-
ings. The estimated post-labeling premium is approximately 12%, which corresponds to a
premium of $20 per square foot. Combining these results with cost estimates of obtaining a
green label, which range from $0.05-$8.50 per square foot, suggests the net benefits of green
labels vary from $11.50-$19.95 per square foot. The estimated net benefits suggest building
owners obtain sizable returns from green labels, but they are smaller than previous esti-
mates that have ignored the costs of green labeling strategies, which have found premiums
of 13%-20%, corresponding to benefits in the range of $22-$42 per square foot (Eichholtz et
al. (2010), Fuerst and McAllister (2011b), Eichholtz et al. (2013)). The statistically insignif-
icant pre-labeling premiums suggest nonrandom selection is not a source of bias affecting the
estimated benefits of labels.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents background information on green
labels and reviews the existing evidence on their effectiveness. Section 3 describes the data
set creation, Section 4 presents the empirical strategy, and Section 5 discusses the results.
Section 6 briefly concludes.
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2.Background
Green labels are awarded to buildings that demonstrate superior energy and environmen-
tal performance. In the U.S. buildings sector, two organizations are responsible for assigning
the lion’s share of these labels, the U.S. Green Buildings Council (USGBC) and the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA). The USGBC’s Leadership in Energy and Environmental
and Design (LEED) designation was introduced in 1993 to aid stakeholders involved in the
building construction and operation trades to improve the environmental sustainability of
the building stock (USGBC (2009a)). The EPA’s Energy Star label was established in 1992
as a voluntary labeling program to promote energy efficient products. The Energy Star pro-
gram was expanded to office buildings starting in 1999, and is awarded to buildings in the
top quartile of energy performance (EPA (2012), EPA (2013)).
While the growth of certified commercial building space was slow to take off in the early
years of these programs, the past five years have seen close to exponential growth in the
fraction of certified space, with close to 20,000 certified commercial buildings in the U.S. as
of the end of 2010 (Kok et al. (2011)). Several studies have been conducted on the market
premiums resulting from green-labeled buildings, which have found benefits in the range of
$22-$42 per square foot (Eichholtz et al. (2010), Fuerst and McAllister (2011b), Eichholtz
et al. (2013)).
The Energy Star and LEED labels are widely touted by policymakers as bringing about
improvements in the energy conservation characteristics of the building stock and increasing
building values (EPA (2011), USGBC (2013), McGraw Hill Construction (2010)). However,
though some studies have found that green-labeled buildings are associated with lower levels
of energy use compared to an average building (Turner and Frankel (2008), EPA (2006)), oth-
ers have found that ex-post evaluations of the energy performance of many labeled buildings
is poorer than expected (ACEEE (2008), Newsham et al. (2009)).
Another consideration in the evaluation of green-labeled building performance is that
participation in labeling programs is voluntary. The labeling procedure begins when a build-
ing owner or operator registers with either LEED or Energy Star for the purpose of obtaining
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a label. This is followed by third-party building energy performance monitoring, typically
for an 8-12 month period (USGBC (2009b)), and a building is certified as ‘green’ only after
adequately demonstrating criteria for energy and environmental performance above a prede-
termined threshold. It is the voluntary participation decision at the outset of the process that
creates a potential for selection bias in the estimation of the benefits of a label. Nonrandom
selection into the pool of certified buildings is evidenced by the observable characteristics
of green buildings in comparison to the average office building: the typical green building
is 15 stories high and measures over 300,000 square feet, in contrast with the average of-
fice building, which is about two stories high and measures about 20,000 square feet (EIA
(2003a)).
3. Data
Both of the major green labeling programs for the building sector, Energy Star and LEED,
publish the addresses of labeled buildings on their website. I matched the addresses of labeled
buildings to the CoStar Group’s repeat sales database, a building-level archive of commercial
building sales transactions with detailed hedonic characteristics on 2.4 million commercial
properties. Each building-level observation is geocoded with a precise latitude and longitude
coordinate. CoStar’s transaction notes were used to discard sales observations that were
made either under “distressed” conditions, deferred tax transactions (or 1031 exchanges),
bulk or portfolio transactions (which results in a sale price per square foot representing
an average over several disparate properties), or that were not arm’s-length transactions.
I also discarded building observations that underwent a renovation between the pre- and
post-labeling sale transactions, in order to rule out price effects that arise from a change in
building features that are not controlled for in both the pre- and post-labeling transactions.1
This matching process culminated in 206 labeled buildings with recorded sale transactions
both before and after a building was labeled.
The hedonic building characteristics included in the analysis are building size, number
1Therefore, the labeled sample includes office buildings with pre- and post-labeling sale prices that were
either renovated before both transactions occurred or with no recorded renovations.
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of stories, building age, year of sale, latitude, longitude, an indicator for high quality class
A buildings and an indicator for building-level amenities.2
Figure 1 presents a map of the labeled building geographic distribution. The sample
of green buildings spans eighteen states. At the state-level, California, Texas, Florida and
Colorado have the largest concentration of green buildings in the sample, a pattern consistent
with the population of green buildings in the U.S. (EPA (2011)).
A comparison group for the green buildings was created by matching each labeled building
with two unlabeled buildings located in the same “market” as defined by CoStar, which
approximately corresponds to the U.S. Census definition of a metropolitan statistical area.
The labeled buildings were matched to their comparison buildings using the Mahalanobis
metric, which selects matches by finding the smallest covariance-weighted Euclidean distance
between the vectors of hedonic characteristics for a given labeled building and the unlabeled
buildings in the same market. Since year of sale is one of the variables in the vector of hedonic
characteristics, the matching process resulted in two separate comparison samples, one for the
pre-labeling sales transactions and one for the post-labeling transactions. Figure 2 illustrates
sets of pre- and post- labeling matches for green buildings in Boston, Massachussetts and
Denver, Colorado.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the pre-labeling sample, and Table 2 presents
summary statistics for the post-labeling sample. The normalized difference for each covari-
ate presented in the last column of each Table is a measure of overlap among the covariates
in the green buildings and their control samples. A normalized difference less than 0.3 or
so is typically considered good overlap (Imbens and Wooldridge (2009)).3 Though the green
buildings are slightly larger and taller than their controls on average, there is sufficient vari-
ability in these characteristics to maintain good overlap for all of the observable covariates.
2Amenities include: property manager on site, concierge, corner lot, courtyard or atrium, waterfront
location, or the availability of nearby public transit, restaurants, day care, retail shops, or a fitness center.
3The normalized difference reports the difference in average covariate values by treatment status, scaled
by the square root of the sum of a given covariate’s variance.
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4. Empirical Strategy
The outcome of interest is the sample average treatment effect on the treated (SATT), the
average impact of green labels on selling values in labeled buildings. In contrast to previous
work that has focused on estimating the SATT on building values exclusively in buildings
that have already received a label, I estimate the SATT in two samples: selling prices in
buildings that have received a green label and selling prices in the same set of buildings
before they received a label.
Buildings are assigned to one of two states: labeled and unlabeled buildings. Using the
potential outcomes framework, let Di=1 if building i is green-labeled, and Di=0 if building
i has never received a label. Potential outcome Yi(1) denotes building values in building i
contingent on having received a label (at the time of data collection), and potential outcome
Yi(0) denotes building values in building i, contingent on never having received a label. The
SATT can be expressed as
αTT = E [Yi(1)|Di = 1]− E [Yi(0)|Di = 1] = E [Yi(1)− Yi(0)|Di = 1] . (1)
Observed prices in green-labeled buildings can be used to identify E [Yi(1)|Di = 1], av-
erage building values in labeled buildings. However, the counterfactual E [Yi(0)|Di = 1],
average building values in labeled buildings had they never received a label, is unobserved. If
the set of green-labeled buildings had been randomly selected to receive a label, it would be
the case that, on average, values in labeled buildings had they not received a label would be
the same as values in buildings that never obtained a label:
E [Yi(0)|Di = 1] = E [Yi(0)|Di = 0] , (2)
and the set of buildings that have never received a label could be used as a control group to
estimate the unobserved counterfactual. However, the voluntary nature of the green-labeling
decision creates nonrandom selection into treatment, such that
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E [Yi(0)|Di = 1] = E [Yi(0)|Di = 0] + η, (3)
where η represents a systematic variation in the value of the set labeled of buildings, before
they receive a label, from the set of buildings that have never been labeled, which may
result from nonrandom selection. My identification strategy generates a credible estimand
of the causal effect of the label (denoted α∗TT ) by pointing out that if the unobservable
characteristics in green buildings that generate η remain constant before and after a building
receives a label, the following two SATT estimands can be used to identify α∗TT :
αprl = E [Yi,prl(1)|Di = 1]− E [Yi,prl(0)|Di = 0] + η, (4)
where αprl measures the average difference in green-labeled buildings and nearby control
buildings before they received a label (prl refers to this pre-labeled status), and
αpol = E [Yi,pol(1)|Di = 1]− E [Yi,pol(0)|Di = 0] + η, (5)
where αpol measures the average difference in green-labeled buildings and nearby control
buildings after they received a label (pol refers to this post-labeled status).
α∗TT is generated by taking the difference between (5) and (4):
α∗TT = αpol − αprl
= E [Yi,pol(1)|Di = 1]− E [Yi,pol(0)|Di = 0] + η
− E [Yi,prl(1)|Di = 1]− E [Yi,prl(0)|Di = 0] + η
= E [Yi,pol(1)|Di = 1]− E [Yi,pol(0)|Di = 0]
− E [Yi,prl(1)|Di = 1]− E [Yi,prl(0)|Di = 0] .
(6)
Repeat sales data on pre- and post-labeling green building valuations can be used to difference
out the η in the last two lines of equation (6). This generates the causal effect of green labels
on values under the assumption that the unobservable characteristics determining selection
into treatment remain constant before and after a building receives a label.
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4.1 Spatial semi-parametric matching
To estimate α∗TT , defined above, I implement a spatial matching estimator combined with
regression-based bias adjustment (Abadie and Imbens (2006) and Abadie and Imbens (2011)).
The average treatment effect on the treated in the pre-labeling is estimated by:
τprl =
1
N1
∑
j∈I1
[
Yj −
∑
k∈I0
1
mjk
(Yk + µˆ0(Xj)− µˆ0(Xk))
]
, (7)
where N1 is the number of green-labeled buildings (hereafter referred to as green buildings),
I1 is the set of green buildings, I0 is the set of control buildings, and j and k index green and
control buildings, respectively. Yj and Yk denote building values (log selling price) in the
pre-labeled green buildings and the control buildings; Xj and Xk denote covariate vectors for
the green and control units. The term (µˆ0(Xj)− µˆ0(Xk)) implements a bias adjustment that
modifies the control outcome Yk for the difference in covariate values between the green and
control units, Xj and Xk. Since the outcome of interest is the SATT, the estimate for µˆ(·)
is obtained by regressing the control outcomes on their covariates (see Abadie and Imbens
(2011) for further details).
Each green building j is matched with the two ‘nearest’ control buildings located in
the same real estate market, where nearness is defined using the Mahalanobis distance, as
described in the previous Section. The control observations are indexed by k, and mjk is the
number of matches for observation j. In this case, mjk=2. The Mahalonobis metric used
for matching incorporates the following covariates: building size, number of stories, building
age, year of sale, latitude, longitude, an indicator for class A buildings and an indicator
for building-level amenities.4 The bias-adjustment covariates included in the regression to
obtain µˆ includes the same covariates. The average distance between the buildings in this
approach is about 4 miles. The importance of controlling for locational characteristics at a
fine geographic scale is well-established in the real estate literature (Bollinger et al. (1998)),
and from an econometric standpoint avoiding ‘geographic mismatch’ is important in order
4Amenities include: property manager on site, concierge, corner lot, courtyard or atrium, waterfront
location, or the availability of nearby public transit, restaurants, day care, retail shops, or a fitness center.
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to achieve balance among the unobservables in the treated and control samples (Heckman
et al. (1997), Duranton and Overman (2005)). However, since green building tend to be
‘trophy’ or landmark buildings with unique characteristics (for example, they are taller and
larger than nearby buildings), few buildings with similar observable characteristics appear
in the immediate vicinity of a green building. For this reason, the matching region was set
to buildings in the same metropolitan area.
The matching estimator from equation (7) is also implemented to estimate post-labeling
valuations:
τpol =
1
N1
∑
j∈I1
[
Yj −
∑
l∈I0
1
mjl
(Yl + µˆ0(Xj)− µˆ0(Xl))
]
, (8)
where the same set of green buildings Yj is used, but since the year of sale differs from the
pre-labeling sample, the set of control buildings l is also different.5
4.2 Realized benefit-cost ratios
Having obtained estimates for both τˆprl and τˆpol, which are both asymptotically normally
distributed (Abadie and Imbens (2006)), the following test is applied to assess whether the
two estimates are statistically different:
diff =
τˆpol − τˆprl√
se(τˆpol)2 + se(τˆprl)2
. (9)
If diff is greater than the critical value for a two-tailed Z-test at the 5% significance level
(1.96), I will take this as evidence that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the pre- and
post-labeling premiums differ from each other. Either way, the term αˆ∗ = τˆpol − τˆprl is an
estimate of the causal effect of a green label, and represents the average benefits a building
owner can expect from obtaining a label. It is also measures the market valuation of the
expected stream of benefits accruing from a green label.
5However, close to 50% of the control buildings appear in both samples.
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From a policy evaluation perspective, a more relevant calculation is the benefit cost ratio
of a green-labeling policy, which requires considering the present value of the net benefits (i.e.
the benefits net of the costs) of a label. To calculate the average net benefit, I will combine
αˆ∗ with information on the costs of obtaining a green label, discussed below in Section 5.2.
5 Results
5.1 Matching
The first row of Table 3 presents the results of estimating equation 7, and the second row
presents results for equation 8. For purposes of comparison, columns (1) and (2) show results
when only geographic distance is used as a criterion to match green buildings with the two
control nearest buildings. Columns (3) and (4) show results from using the Mahalanobis
metric and all observable covariates to match green buildings with the nearest two control
buildings located in the same real estate market. Columns (1) and (3) present results of
applying a simple matching estimator without applying the bias adjustment function µˆ0.
Columns (2) and (4) show the results of implementing the bias-adjustment.
Both the geographic matching and Mahalanobis matching estimates indicate a statis-
tically insignificant pre-labeling premium, as shown in the first row, columns (2) and (4).
In contrast, the post-labeling premium is statistically significantly positive using both geo-
graphic and Mahalanobis matching, shown in columns (2) and (4) of the second row. The
premium is approximately 9% using the bias-adjusted geographic matching estimator, in col-
umn (2), and approximately 12% using the bias-adjusted Mahalanobis matching estimator,
in column (4). Plugging the bias-adjusted estimates from column (4) into equation 9 results
in a test statistic value of 2.45, which provides evidence to reject the null hypothesis that
the pre- and post-labeling premiums are equal, at the 1% level.
To address concerns regarding whether premiums in the pool of buildings with sales
observations both before and after a building sold may differ from those in which only one
post-labeling transaction is observed, the third row of Table 3 presents results of applying
equation 8 to estimate post-labeling premiums in the set of buildings that sold after being
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labeled. As shown, 206 buildings were observed to be sold both before and after they
were labeled, whereas 966 building sale transactions were observed in the full post-labeled
sample. The bias-adjusted Mahalanobis matching premium in the full post-labeled sample
is approximately 10%, which is not statistically different from the estimate of 12% in the
restricted sample. These results suggest that, on the basis of post-labeling premiums in the
two samples, there is no evidence of selection into the pool of buildings that sold twice,
before and after they were labeled, compared to buildings that are only observed to have
sold after they were labeled.
5.2 Net benefits
Given that the pre-labeling premium is statistically zero, the estimated premium for a
green building, as discussed in the previous section, is approximately 12%. Since the average
building selling price prior to receiving a label is $171 per square foot, the average premium
is approximately $20 per square foot. This figure reflects the market’s valuation of the net
present value of the benefits of owning and operating a green building.
Costs incurred in the green-labeling process include capital costs of building upgrades,
process modifications, labeling fees, as well as consulting and contractor fees. The number
of studies that have assessed the financial costs of green labels is smaller than the work that
focus solely on their benefits by an order of magnitude, and the former tend to be based
on small sample sizes. Studies that do assess the financial costs of green buildings suggest
the additional outlays, for buildings of approximately the same size and height as those in
the sample, range from about $0.35-$8.50 per square foot (Kats (2003a), Kats (2003b) and
Yudelson (2007)). The labeling fees alone come to about $0.05-$0.07 per square foot.
These benefit and cost values lead to a range of net benefit estimates. On the high end, a
building owner that purchases an unlabeled building that is already energy efficient, without
any need for capital upgrades or process changes, and does not pay a premium for the energy
efficiency characteristics (a likely outcome based on the pre-labeled building results in Table
3) can expect to pay only about $0.05 per square foot to obtain a label. This reduces the
benefit estimate of $20 per square foot by a negligible amount, to $19.95 per square foot. On
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the lower end, a building owner who must first invest in building upgrades and all the other
associated costs before receiving a label can expect a net benefit between $11.50-$19.50 per
square foot.
6. Conclusion
This paper has proposed a simple approach to identify the causal net benefits of green
labels. Most of the popular discussion on the benefits of green labels has both ignored the
potential bias that may arise from nonrandom selection and neglected to consider the costs
incurred in the labeling process. I have implemented a matching estimator that makes use
of green building sales transactions before they received a label to identify the causal value
premium of a green label, of approximately 12%, or $20 per square foot. This estimate
represents the real estate markets’s assessment of the net present value of the benefits of
owning and operating a green building. Combining these results with estimates of the costs
associated with obtaining a green label suggests the causal net benefits of obtaining a green
label range from $11.50-$19.95 per square foot.
These estimated net benefits suggest building owners obtain returns from green labels
that are smaller than previous estimates that have focused solely on the benefits, which have
found premiums of 13%-20%, corresponding to benefits in the range of $22-$42 per square
foot (Eichholtz et al. (2010), Fuerst and McAllister (2011b), Eichholtz et al. (2013)). This
implies that while the lower bound of previous estimates of the benefits of green labels are
quite similar to the estimated premiums in this study, incorporating the costs of green labels
can reduce the estimated net benefits by up to 50%.
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Figure 1: Sample Green Building Distribution
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Figure 2: Building Match Examples
(a) Green building, MA (b) Control, pre-label, MA (c) Control, post-label, MA
(d) Green building, CO (e) Control, pre-label, CO (f) Control, post-label, CO
Notes: Each row shows a green building and its associated pre- and post-labeling matches. The top row
buildings are located in Boston, Massachusetts. The bottom row buildings are located in Denver,
Colorado.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics, Pre-Label Sample
green control norm. diff
mean sd min max mean sd min max
Stories 14.7 11.5 2 62 11.1 9.4 1 52 0.24
Size (000s) 322.2 270.1 11.4 2,002 226.2 262.3 1.03 2,550 0.25
Year Sold 2001 3.5 1991 2013 2002 4.1 1991 2009 -0.19
Built 1982 16.9 1912 2004 1979 19.6 1900 2006 0.12
Class A (%) 82.0 38.4 0 100 74.0 43.9 0 100 0.14
Amenities (%) 97.1 16.8 0 100 97.3 16.1 0 100 -0.01
Observations: 206 412
Notes: The table presents summary statistics for the sample of green buildings and nearby controls located
within the same real estate market and matched using the Mahalanobis metric. The normalized difference
presented in the last column measures the degree of overlap for each covariate across the treated and
control samples. It is defined as (X¯1 − X¯0)/(
√
S21 + S
2
0), where X¯i denotes the mean of a given covariate
for each treatment status i = 0, 1, and S2i denotes the sample variance of Xi. A normalized difference of
less than 0.3 is typically considered good overlap.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics, Post-Label Sample
green control norm. diff
mean sd min max mean sd min max
Stories 14.7 11.5 2 62 11.1 9.1 1 49 0.25
Size (000s) 322.2 270.1 11.4 2,002 229.5 241.2 1.0 2,438 0.26
Year Sold 2007 2.2 2000 2013 2006 2.2 1997 2009 0.32
Built 1982 16.9 1912 2004 1980 20.2 1900 2009 0.08
Class A (%) 82.0 38.4 0 100 74.0 43.9 0 100 0.14
Amenities (%) 97.1 16.8 0 100 95.9 19.9 0 100 0.05
Observations: 206 412
Notes: The table presents summary statistics for the sample of green buildings and nearby controls located
within the same real estate market and matched using the Mahalanobis metric. The normalized difference
presented in the last column measures the degree of overlap for each covariate across the treated and
control samples. It is defined as (X¯1 − X¯0)/(
√
S21 + S
2
0), where X¯i denotes the mean of a given covariate
for each treatment status i = 0, 1, and S2i denotes the sample variance of Xi. A normalized difference of
less than 0.3 is typically considered good overlap.
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Table 3: Matching and Bias-Adjusted Matching Results
Nearest two control neighbors located near a green building
(1) (2) (3) (4) Treated Control
Dependent Variable:
Log(price) -0.006 0.040 -0.104∗∗ -0.051 206 412
pre-label (0.040) (0.040) (0.047) (0.047)
Log(price) 0.507∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗ 206 412
post-label (0.039) (0.039) (0.050) (0.050)
Log(price) 0.120∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗ 966 1932
all sales, post-label (0.044) (0.044)
Geographic Distance yes yes no no
Mahalanobis Distance no no yes yes
Bias-Adjusted no yes no yes
Mean distance, geo. match: 0.4 mi
Mean distance, maha. match: 4.2 mi
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗ indicates significance at 10% level, ∗∗ indicates significance at
5% level, and ∗∗∗ indicates significance at 1% level. Clustering is at the market level.
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